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Vigil, Joann Lorraine Clark, and Sharon 0. Bowen, appeal

from memorandum decisions entered in the District Court of weber
county, State of Utah granting summary judgment of dismissal of
the complaints under U.C.A.

78-45-l et.seq.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Appellants

brought separate actions in the District

Court of Weber County,

the Honorable Calvin Gould, presiding,

for reimbursement of funds expended for public assistance, under
Utah Code An nota ted § 78-45-9

( 195 3) as amended.

All three

cases were heard together on a motion for summary judgment by the
defendants, on April 30, 1975.
Arguments of counsel for both plaintiffs and defendants
~represented

granted.

and defendants' motion for summary judgment was

The court issued identical memorandum decisions in each

of the three cases, holding that plaintiffs could not recover
reimbursement under U.C.A.

78-45-9, as amended, and would not be

entitled to a judgment for a sum certain without first obtaining
a court order specifying the amount of monthly support.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the memorandum decisions and
petition

the Court to vacate the orders granting summary

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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judgment with instructions to re-hear the cases under u.C.A.
78-45-9, consistent with the directive of this court in the
~otter.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are substantially the same in all three cases,
and

are not in dispute.

In each case, the defendant-obligor

abandoned his family, leaving them without support and dependant
upon the State of Utah to provide assistance.
divorce or
any

sep~rate

maintenance order

of the three cases.

There was no

decreed by the court in

There has never been any child support

or sum certain of support ordered by any court to be paid by the
respondents, nor have any of the respondents paid any.

Thus,

the appellants were forced to seek and receive assistance for
their families from the Utah State Department of Social Services.
In the Bowen case, for instance, Plaintiff Sharon 0. Bowen
received assistance from November 1972 through February 1973,
receiving a total of $616.00.

Under U.C.A. 78-45-9, as amended,

the State of Utah is granted derivative rights to seek reimbursement from obligors who fail to support their obligees and thereby
force the State to assume the burden.

Therefore, the State of

Utah sought reimbursement of a sum certain of $616.00 from
defendant-obligor, Kim R. Bowen; the same basis exists for the
Sponsored
the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
other
twoby cases
as Law
well.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Judge Gould of the Weber County District Court ruled that
such reimbursement cannot be enforced for a sum certain without
a prior court order specifying the amount of monthly support.
From this decision, the Appellants appeal the decision of the
District court.
ARGU!1ENT
POINT I
A FATHER IN THE STATE OF UTAH HAS A DUTY OF SUPPORT TO
CHILDREN, INDEPENDENT OF ANY COURT ORDER OF A SUM CERTAIN.
In the State of Utah,

father has a duty to support his

children, independent of any court order.
both state statute and common law.
~ah

Utah has codified what the

Supreme Court has declared for years:

support his wife and child.

Such is imposed by

Every man shall

Defendants-obligors are not excused

from this responsibility and obligation merely because they have
not previously been ordered by a court to pay a certa:i.n amount.
A father's obligation to support his children is established
~Utah Code Annotated

78-45-3(1953 as amended) which provides:

"DUTY OF MAN (78-45-3)
wife and his child."

Every Man shall support his

The Utah Supreme court in Ottley v. Hill 446 P.2d 301, 302,
said in reference to this statute:
"It was the duty of the plaintiff to support

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Further, under the common law of this state, the duty of
support is likewise well established.
2r1 26~,

311 P.2d 788

(1957)

Pees v. Archibald 6 utah

states as follows:

"This court has invariably emphasized
the father's obligation to support his
children based upon the elementary principle that the law imposes upon those who
bring children into the world the duty to
care for and support them during their
minority and dependency."
These specific requirements of support are not only of
long time standing, but the legislature of the State of Utah
has found it advantageous to spell out this responsibility in
other areas.

Utah Code Annotated 30-2-9 states as follows:

"Family Expenses ... :
"The expenses of the family and the education of
the children are chargeable upon the property
of both husband and wife or of either of them
and in relation thereto they may be sued
jointly or separately."
Utah's sister states have likewise established appellants
~s1tion

that the father has the duty on continuing support.

Alaska quoted Utah's Rees v. Archibald in Hougar v. Hougar
449 P.2d 766

(1969) where in the court said:

"A father has the primary and continuing obligation to
support his children."
Colorado has held in McQuade v. McQuade 358 P.2d 470
Colo. (1960) that:
"Both the common law and Colorado case law
establish that the primary obligation for the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
support ofLibrary
a minor
upon byits
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Act, administered
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POINT

II

TilE c,uTY OF SUPPORT IS ENFORCEABLE INDEPENDEHT OF ANY
COL''<T

ORDER OR DECREE FOR A SUM CERTAIN.
Ut~h

Code Annotated, Section 78-45-3, supra, provides a

statutory duty of support for fathers.

There is no need to

establish that duty of support again by court order before the
duty can be enforced.
77-6la-2 (f)

Further, Utah Code Annotated Section

(as amended 1973) is a definition of "Duty of support"

and says:
"Duty of support includes any duty of
support imposed or imposable by law, or by
any court order, decree, or judgment ... "
(Emphasis added)
This duty of support may be imposed upon fathers in Utah
then either by law or by court order.
~wever,

There is no requirement,

of the latter being present before the former duty is

enforceable.

Either one is sufficient, independent of the other,

ro establish an enforceable duty of support.
Already referred to is utah Code Annotated 78-45-9 authoriz<ng enforcement of the obligor's duty.

It states:

"The obligee may enforce his right of
support against the obligor and the state
department of public welfare may proceed
on behalf of the obligee to enforce his
right of support against the obligor ... "
(Emphasis added)
Section 9 makes no mention whatsoever of a support order,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and thi,; is because the very purpose of 78-45-3, supra, is to
establish an enforceable statutory duty of support.

This then

obviates the necessity of going to court to get an order before
iln obligee is able to enforce a right of support in utah.
This rationale is supported by Commissioners' statements
about the purpose of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
of 1vhich 78-45-3 and 9 are part; and also by 1'/illiam Brockelbank
in his now famous treatise,
~ort,

2nd Edition.

Interstate

Enforceme~t

of Family

In the Commissioners' Prefatory Note to

the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, they enunciate as
a basic purpose of the act the establishment of a statutory duty
of support to be used in conjunction with URESA.
Fam. and Health Laws 133).

(U.C.A. Matr.,

The famous act was passed to eliminate

confusion among lawyers who believed URESA was unenforceable without a court order declaring a duty of support.

Commenting on this,

BroC'kelliank said:
. j i / t is suprising to find /such/
misconceptions.
One such is that only orders
of support of one state will be enforced in
another under the Act.
In fact it is 'all
duties,' and the d~, of course, may grow
out of the order of support or a judgment
or decree but is equally a duty if it never
has_received judicial attention and now is
the basis of litigation for the first time
under the Act."
(Emphasis added)
Brockelban·>. and Infansto,

Interstate Enforcement of Family

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~poort,

2nd ed.,

1971, p. 39.

These "all duties" spoken of by

Brockelbank encompass not only court orders of support, but
statutory

(such as 78-45-3)

and common law duties of support

as well.
Thus, Utah Code Annotated 78-45-3 establishes a statutory
right of support for children from their fathers, and 78-45-9
Utah Code Annotated

(1957) gives the obligee the right to enforce

rl1is duty of support.

Read together, there is no need to establish

again by court order a duty of support before such duty can be
enforced.
California, with a support statute similar to Utah's law,in
~s

Angeles County v. Frisbie 122 P.2d 526, la Cal. 2d 634:
"As so employed, these words, referable
to the recoupment of sums already paid, indicate the legislature's intention by this
enactment to provide the county with
authority to prosecute an ordinary cause of
action for the recovery of money and negative the requirement of a judicial decree
to determine the measure of the debt as the
maintenance of such action."
(Emphasis added)
The language of the court is too clear to be mistaken: when

the support obligation is established by statute, there is no
need to go into to court and get a court order prior to an action
for reimbursement based on the statute.
Cases from nearly all jurisdictions across the United States
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization
provided by the Institute
Museum and
Library Services
are to
numerous
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Lengthy
annotations
andof many
cases
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-support whnt Utah has nlready declared in Rees v. Archibald,
~·

and that is that the father has an absolute duty to care

:or his family.
POINT III
T!Jr. STP1TE 01' UTAH ACTING AS A THIRD PARTY PROVIDING SUPPORT
A.~SISTANCE

TO A FATfillR' S MINOR CHILDREN, HAS A RIG l-IT OF REIMBURSE-

l\ENT AGAINST THE FATHER.

The State of Utah,

in order to establish a statutory duty of

sJpport, has adopted the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
c.C.A.

78-45-l et seq. of which Section 9 provides for the en-

:orcement of the rights of support created by the act, and also
provides a right of action for the state to secure reimbursement
~r

any support rendered to an obligee owed by an obligor.
§78-45-9 states:
"Enforcement of right to suppor':-Powers of state department of public welfare. --The
obligee may enforce his right of support against the
obligor and the state department of public welfare
may proceed on behalf of the obligee to enforce his
right of support against the obligor. Whenever the
state department of public welfare furnishes support
to an obligee, it has the same right as the obligee
to whom the support was furnished, for the purpose
of securing reimbursement and of obtaining continuing
support.
Whenever such action is commenced by the
state department of public welfare, it shall be the
duty of the county attorney, of the county of
residence of the obligee, to represent the state
department of public welfare." (emphasis added)

-9-for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The statute defines
(S-45-2.

"obligor~~,

11

0bligee",

and "state" as:

Definitions.--As used in this act:

"State" includes any state, territory or possession of the

ill

united States, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
"Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support.

r2)

"Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is

J)

owed.
Furthermore, the act imposes by law a duty of support upon
~thers

in the State of Utah making them as such an obligor, ie.

a person owing a duty of support.

(See Utah Code Annotated

'8-45-3 cited earlier.)

Therefore, whenever a father in the State of Utah fails to
~ovide

~~
~

necessary support for his children, as is his statutory

and obligation, and the state has to step in and pay welfare

the family,

then the state has a right of action subrogated

•o it by §78-45-9 to seek reimbursement.
Although the exact meaning and interpretation of §78-45-9
1as never been litigated in utah,

it has been the subject of

:·odicial interpretation in our sister state of California.

The

'Jniform Civil Liability for support Act, of which u.c.A. 78-45-9 is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-10Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a part, has been adopted by four states:

Utah,California, New

Hampshire, and Maine.
california's interpretation came in County of Santa Clara

v. Doll, 337 P.2d 582, in which a county was suing a father for
reimbursement for support the county had rendered his illegitimate
son when the man failed to do so.

The court says in part:

"It is the plaintiff's argument that the
minor child Charles has the right to challenge
his own presumed legitimacy and that being true,
the county under the provisions of Civil Code,
section 248, supra, may proceed on behalf of
charles to enforce his right of support; that
is, the county, has the same right as Charles
to secure reimbursement and continuing support
and that the county therefore succeeds to this
right of Charles.
But this is a nonsequitur."
"The plaintiff's argument would be valid
were there no question of illegitimacy involved.
That is, were this a simple case
where the father, about whose identity and
fatherhood there is no dispute, failed or
refused to support his minor child, then,
under the provisions of section 248 the county
could enforce the child's right to receive
such support."
(emphasis added)
Herethe court disallowed the recovery because of the
unsettled illegitimacy issue; however, the court's language
is clear that in a proper case, the statute would allow reimbursement.
In New Hampshire the comparable statute was again the subject
of litigation in Langevin

v. Hillsborough County, 320 A. 2d 635.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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The supreme Court held that where the county had expended funds
for care of neglected or dependent children, the county was
entitled to reimbursement from the children's father.

The Court

said:
"It is clear that the aid which the county provided
to plaintiff William's children gave it a right of action
to recover for such support against their father who was
chargeable therefor either as support granted to dependent
children or to neglected children."
From the previous cases it is clear that the statute
~78-45-9)

(U.C.A.

provides for and the various state courts have inter-

preted it to mean that a state has a right of reimbursement from
the obligor anytime it renders support to an obligee.
Even if it were not for the statutory right found in Utah
Code Annotated §78-45-9, the state would have a right of third
party reimbursement as a matter of common law.

Although not all

familial relationships owe each other a duty of support in the
common law, it is abundantly clear that when a father fails to
~ovide

the necessaries to his child, the parent may, in a proper

case, be held liable for necessaries furnished to the child by a
third person.
"It is a necessary consequence of the duty to support
the child that the parent may, in a proper case, and sometimes as a result of express statutory provision, be held
liable for necessaries furnished to the child by a third
person, whether they are procured by the child or by the
mother; and the mother has the same right as a stranger
to recover from the father for necessaries furnished by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
her to the child,
in the absence of any equitable reason
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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for imposing on her the father's primary obligation to
support the child." 67 CJS §16 P. 698
The rule of law allowing for third party reimbursement for
support rendered to minor children has been clearly established
in the common law of Utah.

The leading case is Rees v. Archibald,

suora. In that case the court held, notwithstanding a divorce
decree, and even in the absence of a support order, that the
father was liable for the expenses of necessaries furnished to
his son by another.

Justice Crockett's language is clear:

"The law is well settled that a father is liable,
even in the absence of express contract, to a third
person furnishing necessities to his child."
The law established by Rees,

id, in Utah was followed and

explicated plainly in the recent case of Baggs v. Anderson,
2d

, 528 P.2d 141(1974).

Ut.

There, the Supreme Court of Utah

held that a third party's right to reimbursement for support
supplied to a child from the failure of the parent to furnish
support, belongs to whoever furnishes the support.

The court

said, as enunciated by Justice Crockett:
"/I/t is appropriate to point out that support money
can fall into two separate categories:
First, the
current and ongoing right of a child to receive support
money from his father (parent) ; and second, the right to
receive reimbursement for support of a child after that
has been done."
As to the first,

the court indirectly made mention to it

later in the opinion, saying:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"For example, suppose an improvident or profligate
mother (or father) ... deserted the child, the child would
still have a right to support from his father (parent);
and the latter cannot divest himself of that obligation,
nor defeat the child's right to support."
and

"As to the second, ~se a father (parent) fails
over a period of time to furnish support of the child,
and the mother, or someone else, furnishes it. That
person then has the right to claim rei~)Ursement from
the parent, the same as any other past debt. This right
of reimbursement belongs to whoever furnished the support;
and it is subject to negotiation, settlement, satisfaction
or discharge in the same manner as any other debt.
(Emphasis added) at P. 143.
The language could not be any clearer:

there exists in

utah as a matter of common law a right for the state of utah to
seek reimbursement from a father for support rendered to his child
when he has failed in his duty to furnish it himself.
The Supreme Court of Arizona best summarizes the position
taken not only by our sister states, but most jurisdictions ln
the United States.
~reau,

In Watkins v. Medical and Dental Finance

Inc., 422 P.2d 696, 697, 698

(Ariz. 1967.) The Court said:

"We agree that under certain circumstances a
promise by a parent to pay for necessaries furnished
his minor child by another may be implied if the
parent has neglected to furnish the necessaries
himself.
Charbonneau v. Norton, 263 Ill. App. 341;
Hard v. Gilbert, 205 Wis. 557, 238 N.W. 371; Kriedo v.
~. 159 Md. 229, l50A. 720; Thompson v. Perr, 238
s.w. 2d22(Mo. App.). Such an implied promise may arise
from the recognized duty that a parent has to support
his or her child.
Barrett v. Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509,
39 P.2d
Sponsored
by the S.J.621.
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"The 'implied promisefor necessaries' doctrine
was not formulated for the purpose of aiding enterprising third parties, but rather is a policy law
meant to impel neglectful parents to assume responsibility for their children's welfare."
Thus,

the common law of the state of Utah, as well as

other states, provides a remedy for reimbursement of third parties
who have rendered support to children, upon the failure of the
natural parents to fulfill their legal duty to do so.
There also remains a strong public policy argument in
favor of allowing the state to recover support monies expended
for needy children.

It is reasonably plain from the course of

the legislation described

(78-45-l et.seq.) that it was the

purpose of the Legislature to provide assistance for children in
need of support, and to establish procedures by which their needs
might be met at public expense as they arose, with subsequent
reimbursement from parents capable of furnishing support.

To

allow an obliger to claim he is under no duty to reimburse the
state would not only defeat the purpose of the legislature, but
it would put an onerous burden upon the taxpayers of Utah by
denying recovery of millions of tax dollars expended by the state
for the support of children of parents who refuse to support their
offspring themselves.
Thus,

by~

standard; statutory, common law, or public

policy,
the state of utah has a right to recover, as a third party
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any monies expended for support of needy children from the obligor
ving the duty of support.

01

POINT IV
THE AMOUNT OF REIMBURSEMENT DUE THE STATE IS EQUAL TO
1'/HATEVER SUM IT PROVIDED FOR SUPPORT OF THE CHILDREN, IN THE
ABSENCE OF A COURT ORDER.
Under Utah Code Annotated 78-45-9 as quoted
state can enforce two separate rights of support.

earlie~

the

The first is

the right to reimbursement for funds expended, and the second
is the right of securing continuing support from the father of
neglected children.

The standard for securing the latter is

provided for by statute, U.C.A. §78-45-7, which enumerates seven
criteria for determining support.
a~parently

This statute, however,

applies only to prospective support.

As to the former,

the legislature must have assumed the commonly accepted
of

"reimbursemen~

to it.
1n

meani~g

was so clear that there could be no dispute as

Perhaps they were right, as there has been no case law

Utah interpreting the meaning of the word "reimbursement" in

§78-45 -9.
Fortunately, however, our sister state of California has
litigated the point in dealing with the support statute very
similar to our own.
~'

In the case of Los Angeles county v.

FrisbQ~,

the court was called upon to determine the meaning of the

by the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
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stotute.

The California Supreme Court said:

"Preliminary to our consideration of the questions
raised by the parties relative to the meaning of the
pilrticular language employed in these code provisions,
it is pertinent to observe that the object of all
construction of statutes is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the legislature ... The
primary and ordinary meaning of the word 'rei~rse'
is 'to pay back, to make restoration, to repay that
expended.'
Webester's New International Dictionary,
Second Edition; Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary.
The actual amount due depends upon the sums determined
by the board of supervisors to be representative of the
county's expense for the relief granted." (Emphasis added)
Here the court defined "reimbursement" as "to repay that
expended," and further indicated the actual amount to be reimbursed was that sum which the county actually expended.

Thus,

even where a court order has not been previously entered as to
a particular sum certain due for support, the amount due for
reimbursement under U.C.A. §78-45-9 can quickly and simply be
ascertained by determining the amount the state has expended for
chil.d support.

The former is equal to the latter.

In Langevin cited earlier, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
affirmed the findings of the trial court as to the amount of
reimbursement due:
" ... /T/he county is entitled to reimbursement from
William Langevin relative to sums expended by the
County for care of William Langevin's children."
Thus, the court found the amount of reimbursement due was
equal to the sum expended by the county.
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Utah 300,

177 P. 2d l32

(1946)

that where the defendant had

failed to pay some past support money:
"We see no reason why the court could not likewise
require him to pay a sum equal to tiE installments which
had been unpaid." at 307.
By simply extending the court's reasoning to the instant

set of facts, we see no reason why the court could not likewise
require a defendant to pay a sum equal to the installments
which had been paid by the state.
It is therefore clear, by statute and the common law,
that when the amount of reimbursement sought has not been
previously determined by a court ordered sum certain, then the
amount of reimbursement is simply equal to the amount expended
by the third party for support of the children.

CONCLUSION
The real issue in these cases can be summarized as whether
or not the State of Utah can seek reimbursement from obligors
under U.C.A.

78-45-9, for assistance rendered to obligees, with-

out a court ordered sum certain duty of support.

Appellants urge

that the very purpose of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support
Act, 78-45-l et. seq., of which 78-45-9 is a part, is to statutorily
impose that very duty, and thereby negative the requirement of
getting that duty declared by court order and having a sum certain
set.
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Appellants further urge that reliance on the District
courts' construction and rationale of §78 -45-9 emasculates the
law and negates the purpose for which the legislature passed
the law.
To say no amount of reimbursement is allowable simply because no sum certain has been previously ordered by the court,
where there is a sum certain paid by the state, on behalf of
Respondents' minor children, is to torture a simple issue.
The equitable answer is that the amount of reimbursement
due is equal to the amount the state paid out in assistance.
Aside from the legal arguments, so strongly in favor of
appellants' position, the public policy arguments are overwhelming in favor of appellants position.

It is unconscionable

to force the taxpayers of Utah to carry any greater tax burden
than is necessary, to support defendant-obligors' children when
the law of Utah provides a remedy against them.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
FRANK V. NELSON
Assistant Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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